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the papers collected in this issue of Phenomenology and Mind were presented 
at the spring school on “naturalism, First-Person Perspective and the 
embodied mind” that was held at san raffaele university, milan in June 
2014. as in the tradition of these philosophical schools, the meeting centred 
on the work of an outstanding living philosopher, namely, on lynne 
rudder baker’s philosophical views, and particularly on her recent book on 
naturalism and the first-Person Perspective.
beside the keynote speaker, there were seven invited speakers from four 
different countries, and ten contributed papers by scholars from five 
different countries, that were selected in a double-blind review process 
from a set of twenty-eight abstracts. the contributed papers subsequently 
underwent a double-blind review process when submitted in their full 
version.
baker’s 2013 book deals with a considerable number of important 
philosophical issues: most directly, the metaphysical one concerning 
the tenability of a scientifically-driven general worldview such as strong 
naturalism, but then also on many other topics: from the definition of our 
essential identity as persons to the specific characterisation of a robust 
first-person perspective in terms of “I-thoughts”, from the criticism against 
eliminativist theories of the self, such as metzinger’s and dennett’s, to the 
discussion on Frankfurt-style compatibilism and moral responsibility. the 
papers presented at the conference discussed all aspects of baker’s proposal, 
and the presence and generosity of the author stimulated much lively 
discussion among senior and junior scholars.
This was not the first time that Lynne Baker came to visit the Faculty of 
Philosophy at san raffaele: she had already been with us in may 2007 and, 
since then, relationships have strengthened, particularly with the main 
organiser of the school, i.e. roberta de monticelli. the papers collected in 
this volume are therefore a homage to the significant work of a philosopher 
and also an act of gratitude for an ongoing and lasting friendship.
In the first paper of this issue, Lynne Baker presents an overview of the 
main idea of naturalism and the first-Person Perspective, particularly stressing 
the distance between her defence of an irreducible first-person perspective 
(FPP) against strong naturalistic and reductionist approaches, and the 
traditional cartesian view according to which the mind is a separate 
substance, autonomous from the body. the difference between humans 
IntRoDUCtIon
massimo reichlin università vita-salute s. raffaele 
11
12
and non humans, she claims, lies in the possession of a robust first-person 
perspective by the human individuals who master language, and in the 
remote capacity to develop linguistic abilities that characterises human 
infants. contrary to descartes’, this approach insists that persons are 
not isolated thinkers or non-social entities, but members of linguistic 
communities; it does not view persons as pure minds, but as necessarily 
embodied; it does not attribute to the FPP any epistemic primacy, since its 
aim is ontological and not epistemological; it does not claim to be without 
presuppositions; it is not dualist; it accepts that many of the primary 
kinds of things are intention-dependent; it does not postulate any inner 
transparent realm to which every individual has infallible access. the 
remoteness of descartes’ perspective from hers would be even greater, baker 
claims, if we should accept that descartes was committed to the goal of the 
absolute conception of reality, as claimed by Williams.
baker defends a metaphysical view that she calls “quasi-naturalism”. in 
the following paper, dermot moran defends a much more anti-naturalistic 
approach to the person or self: the phenomenology view, which is 
characterised not only by the content of experience, but mainly by the 
modes of experience. Phenomenology, in fact, is a non-naturalistic, 
transcendental approach, according to which objects reveal themselves 
from the standpoint of attitudes. all kinds of objectivity, therefore, are 
constituted accomplishments, reached by a certain kind of intentionality. 
this is why, according to phenomenology, persons cannot be wholly 
naturalised, for it takes a personalistic attitude to recognise and understand 
them, and a naturalistic attitude fails to do the job. From the personalistic 
attitude, persons can be seen as sense-makers and position-taking 
individuals, who have a relation to their history and are embodied, social 
and intersubjective agents. it is mainly the capacity to take a stance on 
oneself and one’s life, according to husserl, that characterises persons: 
the ego, as he said, is a centre of affections, actions, interests and habits, 
on which it exerts ownership and control. Persons are intentional agents 
and embodied sense-makers, who are involved in an intersubjective 
horizon of other persons. Persons, moreover, cannot be understood only as 
autonomous, rational beings, for, as embodied beings, they share a world of 
feelings and emotions.
on the opposite side of the spectrum of philosophical positions, michael 
Pauen defends the view according to which naturalism need not endorse an 
eliminativistic position on the self: on the contrary, it can save its concept, 
analysing it in terms of the lower-level phenomena that contribute to its 
implementation. the main problem with the self, according to Pauen, is 
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that every act of reflective identification presupposes self-awareness; this 
means that the self cannot emerge from reflection, but must be originally 
given in some kind of pre-reflexive self-awareness. This in fact happens, 
first, through the body-scheme of the core-self, i.e., the pre-personal, 
affective capacity to recognise our body as our body, and to integrate its 
parts; second, through the theory of mind, that is, the capacity to adopt 
someone else’s perspective and contrast it with our own. this perspective-
taking strategy is much more cognitive than the body-scheme one, for it 
presupposes the ability to distinguish beings whose perspective you can 
take – e.g. humans and non-human animals – from those whose perspective 
you cannot take. now, small children are able to make distinctions between 
the living and non-living, the human and non-human at a very early, pre-
linguistic stage of development; and the same goes for mimicking con-
specifics’ behaviour and distinguishing emotions in facial expressions. 
all this comes well before twelve months of age, before the self-awareness 
evidenced by the traditional mirror test, before the capacity to master first-
person pronouns and other forms of language, and before the capacity to 
correctly attribute beliefs to others. the conclusion is that a naturalistic 
defence of the self takes as central the capacity to recognise yourself 
as yourself: this is not a single ability, but a graduate one, progressively 
developing for emotions, perceptions and beliefs.
the metaphysical discussion between different forms of naturalism and 
other general philosophical approaches is tackled by mario de caro, 
who provides a very detailed overview of the different positions in the 
spectrum of general metaphysical worldviews, from strict naturalism to 
supernaturalism. clearly sympathising with liberal forms of naturalism, 
de caro explores the differences between this widely held philosophical 
position and baker’s proposal of “near-naturalism”. he underlines several 
points of agreement between baker and liberal naturalists such as Putnam, 
pointing to baker’s neutrality concerning the existence of supernatural 
properties as the main feature of genuine disagreement: this neutrality, he 
contends, is too liberal, and cannot be accepted even by liberal naturalists.
the metaphysical issue of supernaturalism also echoes in Katherine 
sonderegger’s paper that offers a theological discussion of the biblical 
doctrine of creation in the light of modern and contemporary naturalistic 
approaches. she notes that a line of ‘reductionism’ concerning the 
conception of nature has always influenced the discussion on the 
interpretation of god’s work in the creation: the ancient atomistic doctrine, 
trying to identify the deepest building blocks of reality, is mirrored by 
the attempt to understand god’s work as the creation of basic particles or 
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elements, from which all particular objects are derived. this reductionist 
approach is also echoed in the medieval notion of ‘prime matter’, as the 
simple element entering into the composition of every created entity, and 
largely influences the philosophies of the modern era and the contemporary 
thermodynamic conception of the cosmos. in the face of this all-embracing 
naturalism, sonderegger contends that christians have reasons to continue 
to talk of god’s work as the creation of individuals, not of particles, force-
fields or natural laws: this is because theology must not aim at harmonising 
the bible with astrophysics, but at guiding humans in the acknowledgment 
of the grace and gift that comes from the richness and plurality of the 
natural world.
a different kind of metaphysical question is taken on by roberta de 
monticelli who discusses baker’s theory of personal identity. according 
to baker, all informative theories of personal identity are third-personal, 
and therefore miss the importance of the FPP; this is why baker’s theory 
accepts circularity as a consequence of the fact that the conditions of 
personal identity cannot be stated in non-personal terms. de monticelli, 
on the contrary, believes that a first-personal but informative theory can 
be formulated if the issue of personal identity is understood in the context 
of a wider account of personal individuality. de monticelli’s main point 
against Baker is that there is more to having a first-person perspective than 
a capacity for self-reference, since pure self-reference is uninformative 
about whose self it is referring to, and baker’s reference to haecceity as 
the decisive property for being a particular person is blatantly circular. 
self-knowledge transcends self-consciousness, and aims at clarifying the 
individual ‘whatness’ of a person. de monticelli argues for a different sort of 
‘haecceitism’, according to which having an individual nature is just as much 
essential to one’s personhood as having a first-person perspective. in the 
wake of leibnizian ‘superessentialism’, she views haecceity as an individual 
essence, i.e. a constraint on possible (co)variations of the properties that 
a person may possess while remaining that same individual; accordingly, 
personal identity across time consists in sharing this substantial unity, or 
‘scotistic heacceity’.
a very different perspective is embraced by michele di Francesco, massimo 
marraffa and alfredo Paternoster who jointly author a paper on real selves? 
subjectivity and the subpersonal Mind that was presented at the school by di 
Francesco alone. their aim is to discuss the issue of subjectivity putting 
aside any metaphysical perspective, and adopting an epistemological and 
explicative attitude. contrary to baker’s approach (but sharing her basic 
intention), they build their vindication of the self not on a metaphysical 
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defence of the first-person perspective, but on a pluralistic reading of the 
nature of the science of the mental and on the assumption of pluralism 
at the explanatory level. Following the bottom-up approach common 
to contemporary cognitive science – an approach that moves from the 
automatic and pre-reflexive construction of representations of the external 
world, through the bodily self-monitoring, to self-consciousness – the 
authors suggest that a robust theory of the self must not understand 
the conscious subject as a primary subject, rather as emerging from the 
mechanisms of the neurocognitive unconscious. this, however, is not to 
accept its epiphenomenality; a robust self, emerging as the ongoing result 
of a narrative self-constructing process, is in fact necessary to explain the 
phenomena of intentional action and self-understanding presupposed by 
commonsense psychology and social science. moreover, according to the 
authors this theory is fully consonant with contemporary (neuro)cognitive 
science, that acknowledges the psychodynamic component of the process of 
narrative self-construction and the stable internalisation of our narrative 
identity in the structures of our personality.
in my own paper, i explore some aspects of baker’s distinction between 
a rudimentary and a robust first-person perspective, and show that 
moral agency requires the second, more complex property. the failure 
to acknowledge the first-personal, reflective character of moral 
judgment accounts for the weakness of most contemporary naturalistic 
reconstructions of morality, that identify the automatic responses of our 
“sentimental brain” as the basic fact of our moral experience. i suggest 
that an appropriate view of morality should emphasise the genuinely first-
personal element of possessing a conscience, as distinct from the possession 
of a moral sense, interpreted in a humean fashion. i then proceed to criticise 
the neatness of baker’s distinction between the rudimentary and the robust 
FPP, suggesting that baker excessively downplays the role of embodiment 
in her account of what it is for the same first-person perspective to be 
instantiated across time.
a variety of philosophical questions emerging from baker’s work is also 
faced by the ten contributed papers that follow. In the first of these, Alfredo 
tomasetta tackles the metaphysical questions posed by baker’s contention 
that “person” is a primary kind and, specifically our primary kind. the 
thesis implies that we are fundamentally persons, and that we cannot fail to 
be persons without ceasing to exist altogether. if this were true, tomasetta 
claims, human persons would have the same persistence conditions of god, 
the angels, and cartesian souls, which allegedly are persons as well. but this 
implication is indefensible, since it is clear that these other entities cannot 
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share our persistence conditions. baker needs an argument to deny that the 
possession of a common primary kind implies having the same persistence 
conditions. however, the three arguments discussed by the autor fail, and 
this suggests that baker’s main thesis is unsubstantiated.
a different metaphysical point is raised by marc andree Weber, who argues 
that baker’s conception of the FPP is not a clear and natural view as it may 
seem. Firstly, she does not distinguish between synchronic and diachronic 
self-attributions of first-person reference: she clearly presupposes our 
persistence through time, but this is not necessarily implied by the 
FPP. moreover, it is not clear that the capacity to make self-attributions 
guarantees the truth of this self-attribution, or that it implies indivisibility 
or unduplicability. In hypothetical scenarios of fission cases Baker suggests 
that there is a fact of the matter as to which person shares the original 
person’s FPP (even though we may not know the right answer), simply 
presupposing that being the same person is having the same FPP; but in such 
cases, to decide which later person shares the original FPP is theoretically 
undecidable and practically unhelpful. Weber suggests a different account, 
according to which an FPP is predicated of a mereological sum of moments 
of consciousness, with no entity unifying them: this would be a reductive 
account, in that it reduces the persistent to the momentary, but would 
preserve baker’s irreducibility of the mental to the physical.
Two more papers are devoted to Baker’s treatment of action. Sofia Bonicalzi 
discusses baker’s view concerning moral responsibility, suggesting that 
Baker’s insistence on the first-person perspective improves on standard 
Frankfurt-style compatibilist accounts, which fall prey to the syndrome 
of the disappearing agent, i.e. make the agent a mere bystander of causal 
factors over which she has no control. however, bonicalzi claims that, even 
though baker’s insistence on the FPP allows to refer opposing mental states 
to oneself, thus generating the impression of causing one’s choices, nothing 
proves that this picture is not a post-factum illusory reconstruction. also in 
baker’s reformulation, therefore, compatibilism cannot make sense of the 
concept of accountability, which is essential for an adequate understanding 
of responsibility. responsibility implies that the agent has control on her 
actions and this seems to require the assumption of irreducible agential 
properties.
alan mcKay criticises baker’s view on downward causation between 
intention-dependent (id) causal property-instances and the objects and 
properties of non-id, physical world, suggesting that the idea that mental 
content, qua content, has effects in the physical world is incoherent. 
according to mcKay, our manifest view of a physical causal relation implies 
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a transfer of energy of some kind: this paradigmatic causation is norm-
free, causally closed, productive, intrinsic, and involves the operation 
of mechanisms, whereas an id causal relation presents none of these 
characteristics. baker’s insistence that id causation is of the same basic kind 
as lower-level causation obscures deep differences between the two. this 
is not to deny our ordinary intuitions about the existence of id causation: 
according to mcKay, these intuitions can be defended by claiming that the 
causal relations between id causes and effects are constituted by manifest 
physical causal relations in favourable circumstances. this means that 
the physical causal relations are transformed, in the context of a complex 
relational milieu, into a quite different causal nexus, constrained by such 
factors as inference, justification, purpose, and desire.
A peculiar, non ontological strategy for providing a justification of our 
belief in the self is explored in the paper by treasa campbell: it is the 
epistemic strategy that builds on hume’s descriptive account of “natural 
beliefs” to show that the belief in the self enjoys a peculiar kind of epistemic 
justification. Campbell shows that natural beliefs play the role of hinges, 
on which all our other questions and doubts turn; this is why, with 
Wittgenstein, we cannot but grant them non-evidential warrants. this 
strategy promises to develop adequate warrant for our belief in the self 
while circumventing the ontological domain.
acknowledging the importance of baker’s defence of the phenomenon of 
the FPP from naturalistic attacks, bianca bellini stipulates three criteria 
for what she calls a faithful description of a phenomenon: consistency with 
the experience of the phenomenon, consistency with the phenomenon’s 
appearance and transcendence, and consistency with the essential 
traits of the phenomenon, as considered from the viewpoint of the 
phenomenological reduction. her discussion charges baker’s account 
for failing to satisfy the second and third criterion: indeed, the FPP, as 
reconstructed by baker, does not embrace an essential trait of the first-
person perspective phenomenon, that is, the phenomenological distinction 
between leib and Körper.
a distinctive phenomenological approach is also at the heart of Patrick 
eldridge’s paper that builds on husserl’s phenomenology of recollection, and 
particularly on his distinction between intentional and inner consciousness, 
to tackle the problem of observer memories. observer memories are 
ordinarily distinguished from field memories in that they are not 
recollections from the first-person point of view, but from the third person 
perspective, that is, memories in which we are spectators of ourselves. 
Philosophers like husserl, who insist that the FPP is a necessary feature of 
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mental phenomena, have a problem in explaining this kind of memories, 
and may be tempted to deny their existence. according to eldridge, however, 
observer memories are genuine forms of recollection that involve an 
original and peculiar form of self-intention, which is self-objectification. 
therefore, this phenomenon is not a counter-example to husserl’s view 
that self-identity and pre-reflective self-consciousness are vital structuring 
elements of mnemic experience. notwithstanding, it shows that self-
consciousness is displayed on a spectrum from immediate, immanent self-
identification to quasi-exterior-representation.
a more empirical inclination can be found in gaetano albergo’s paper, 
analysing the phenomenon of pretense play in children, which he considers 
as an early manifestation of the first-person perspective. In the wake of 
some points also stressed by Pauen, he suggests that the activity of pretense 
presupposes intentionality and is evidence of an early manifestation of 
self-awareness. in fact, the rich phenomenology of pretense and the priority 
of agency over both cognitive representation and the conceptualisation 
of the self-world dichotomy, suggest that a primitive self-consciousness 
is present in pre-linguistic stages of human development. according to 
albergo, therefore, baker’s insistence on the central role of language for the 
acquisition of self-consciousness is not justified by the facts.
also devoted to the empirical side of the debate on the FPP is giuseppe 
lo dico’s paper, discussing the naturalistic rejection of introspection as 
an unreliable method in psychology. a large part of the psychological 
literature, he reports, assumes the self/other parity account, according 
to which knowledge of one’s own and of others’ mental states is equally 
indirect – the argument for this conclusion being that most of our mental 
life is unconscious and that verbal reports are post-hoc theories of what is 
supposed to happen in the mind. lo dico reviews evidence showing that 
data coming from verbal reports, if adequately treated, cannot be defined 
as illusory or confabulatory and can be legitimately used in psychological 
theory. he concludes that subjects’ introspective or verbal reports should be 
taken much more seriously than they presently are, and that the subject’s 
ability to adopt a FPP should be considered as well. this probably means 
that the idea of psychology as a fully naturalised science must be seriously 
revised.
the last paper, also dealing with empirical issues, is valentina cuccio’s 
discussion of the relationship between the mechanism of embodied 
simulation and the notion of mental representation. embodied simulation 
is the activation of the neural circuits controlling certain actions and 
perceptions, when the subject is not actively engaged in them. the recently 
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proposed notion of mental representations in bodily format suggests the 
identification of these representations with the activation of the mirror 
mechanisms that give rise to embodied simulation. according to the author, 
the definition of embodied simulation in terms of mental representations 
is problematic, because embodied simulation does not allow to clearly 
distinguish between the content and the format of the representation, 
or to identify the subject of the mental representation. mechanisms of 
embodied simulation are sub-personal processes, crucially involved in our 
understanding of others; to define them in terms of mental representation 
presupposes a strongly reductionist view that, in the light of baker’s work 
on FPP, is unsubstantiated.
I wish to thank the Scientific Committee of the Spring School for their 
organising efforts: particularly, roberta de monticelli, Francesca de 
vecchi, elisabetta sacchi, emanuele bottazzi. Francesca Forlé and sarah 
songhorian. i also would like to thank the many collegues who accepted to 
review the abstracts presented at the school and the full papers collected 
in this issue. both the spring school and this collection of papers would not 
have been accomplished but for the generous and tireless work of Francesca 
Forlè and sarah songhorian, who helped with more or less everything that 
was needed. on behalf of the research centre Persona, and of the Faculty 
of Philosophy at san raffaele university i warmly thank them for their 
invaluable support. Finally, many thanks also to bianca bellini and laura 
caponetto for their precious work with the editing of the papers, and to 
silvia tossut for the revision of the english form. 
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